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Abstract: Product innovation within strategic alliances differs from product 
innovation within firms due to coordination problems with respect to decision 
making. This exploratory study, drawing on alliance research, strategic decision-
making research and product innovation literature explains these problems at the 
level of product innovation projects in dyadic strategic alliances. In particular, the 
empirical case study results reveal that strategic decision-making effectiveness in 
product innovation projects is dependent upon the nature of the decision-making 
process that in turn is affected by alliance governance structure characteristics. 
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1 Introduction 
Most studies describe new product innovation from the perspective of one organization 
that is responsible for managing projects from idea-generation to launching the product 
onto the market [1]. Nowadays, though, developing new products is increasingly a 
jointly managed activity within a strategic alliance of two or more firms [2]. Alliances 
are defined as “any voluntary agreement between firms that involves exchange, 
sharing, or co-development, and it can include contributions by partners of capital, 
technology, or firms-specific assets” [3]. Product innovation within a strategic alliance 
differs from product innovation in one organization due to coordination problems, 
amongst others, with respect to decision-making. While decision-making affects the 
project success [4] and product innovation success [5], it is bound to be affected by the 
idiosyncrasies of cooperation. For example, Gerwin and Ferris show that shared 
decision-making in contractual alliances is subject to cooperative conditions, such as 
alliance newness, cooperation history and diversion of competences. In addition, the 
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alliance governance structure (e.g. contractual versus institutional) may influence the 
product innovation projects [6].  
 Product innovation research mostly investigates managing projects from the 
perspective of one firm that carries the responsibility even if this firm collaborates with 
suppliers or customers [7]. Furthermore, alliance management and product innovation 
literature show many studies that relate alliance motivation or governance structures 
(such as joint ventures and non-equity alliances) to new product development [8]. 
However, hardly any studies examine how these structures influence the decision-
making in general [9], not to mention decision-making in product innovation projects. 
In addition, studies on product innovation acknowledge the influence of new product 
characteristics and new product development context, while few studies take this 
influence into account when examining product innovation within various alliance 
governance structures [10]. So the question remains as to whether decision-making 
within the product development process stages is more effective within a joint venture 
than for example in bilateral contractual alliance due to its larger interdependence and 
control. 
 The purpose of this study is to contribute to both product innovation and alliance 
research by means of explaining how differences in alliance governance structures 
affect the decision-making process and its effectiveness in the context of product 
innovation projects. The scope of this study is limited to vertical alliances and alliances 
between two firms, which are called dyadic alliances [11]. The paper is organized as 
follows. First, our initial theoretical framework is presented, based on alliance 
management research, decision-making research and product innovation literature. 
Next, we describe the case research method used, followed by the empirical results. 
The last sections describe the conclusions and managerial implications as well as the 
limitations and suggestions for future research.  
2 Theoretical Framework 
Product innovation within an alliance differs from product innovation within one firm 
due to differences in decision making amongst others [12]. Decision-making within 
firms takes place at various levels and in various forms. This study focuses on strategic 
decision-making at the level of product innovation projects in dyadic alliances. The 
effectiveness of decision making may be related to the alliance governance structure. 
Our conceptual framework builds the proposition that decision-making effectiveness is 
affected by decision making process antecedents that in turn are influenced by the 
alliance governance structure.  
Decision-making effectiveness 
Decision-making and its effectiveness is important for product innovation success. 
Eisenhardt and Brown conclude that product innovation process performance is 
determined by the number, diversity and organization of decision-making processes in 
addition to the resources that decision-makers can allocate [13]. Also Van Riel and 
colleagues who investigated high-technology service innovations found that decision-
making effectiveness affects innovation performance [14] In our research the decision-
making within product innovation projects is concerned with physical new products 
and important stage-gate decisions, such as selecting new product ideas, screening the 
one best idea, and selecting the development strategy for subsequent stages [15]. The 
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effectiveness of strategic decision-making is defined as the extent to which a decision 
that is taken meets management objectives made at the time [16]. While some of these 
objectives may refer to the organizational outcome of the implemented strategic 
decision, our interest from a product innovation project point of view mainly lies in the 
objectives at the start of and with respect to decision implementation. In this regard, an 
important objective is the commitment to actions [17]. Commitment is defined as the 
willingness to act upon the decision and is dependent upon decision consensus [18], 
and affects implementation success (at the cost of implementation speed). Consensus is 
defined as the outcome of the decision-making process to which all parties agree that 
the chosen alternative was most feasible [19]. Decision-making effectiveness is 
determined by decision-making process factors. 
Decision-making process 
Decision-making processes play an important role in product innovation processes. In 
every stage of the process decisions are made about the progress of the project [20]. 
Similar to strategic decision problems, decision making in product innovation 
processes is subject to market, process and technical factors that create uncertainty 
[21]. This makes product innovation decisions unstructured, non-routine and complex 
[22] especially with respect to more radical innovations. Product innovation in an 
alliance adds an additional factor of uncertainty: coordination with the partner. 
 A review of the literature shows that mainly two decision-making process factors 
are important to characterize the type of decision-making process [23] and affect its 
strategic decision-making effectiveness: procedural rationality and political activity 
[24]. All these factors are within the realm of managerial control. Procedural 
rationality, which refers to relying upon the rational analysis (compared to intuitive 
analysis) of information relevant to the decision - including the collection of relevant 
and complete information for making the decision - positively affects decision-making 
effectiveness [25]. According to Mintzberg et al. political activity reflects power 
influence among individuals and groups within a decision-making process [26]. It 
consists of bargaining to protect self-interest among those who have some choice 
control [27] Political activities may bring about consensus and commitment when 
individual or group interests coincide with organizational interests [28] or may 
negatively influence decision-making effectiveness when organizational goals do not 
match those of individuals or groups [29]. Political activity needs to be distinguished 
from control procedures such as a dialectical or devil’s advocate approach - used to 
arrive at a decision that may affect decision-making effectiveness in terms of 
consensus and commitment to decision as well as decision outcomes [30]. 
 So far, these factors have not been investigated in the context of product innovation 
processes within dyadic alliances. According to Van Riel the decision-making model, 
rational versus intuitive, is determined by the phase of the innovation process, the 
availability of information, the degree of tacit knowledge, complexity, time pressure, 
and the structure [31]. Here, we focus on structure characteristics with respect to 
alliance governance. 
Alliance governance structure 
While alliance governance structures such as institutional alliances (joint venture), 
equity alliances and contractual alliances, are studied in relation to new product 
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development [32] and decision-making [33], the relationship between alliance 
governance structure and decision-making within a product innovation process 
received scant attention. Alliance governance structure can be typified in terms of two 
main characteristics 1) interdependence and knowledge transfer [34], and 2) control 
mechanisms [35], and 3) flexibility [36]. 
 
Interdependence 
Interdependence strongly relates to coordination costs [37]. The extent of 
interdependence is associated with the need for ongoing task coordination (in case of 
division of labor) and for joint decision making. The higher the degree of ongoing task 
coordination and joint decision making, the more partners integrate processes [38], the 
more information partners must process [39] and the more knowledge partners must 
transfer [40]. On the other hand, uncertainty may hinder knowledge transfer [41]. 
Processing more information and knowledge transfer is positively associated with 
procedural rationality. In addition, task coordination increases shared experiences and 
mutual understanding. Joint decision making is creating ‘mutual hostages’. Therefore, 
both task coordination and joint decision making may decrease the potential for 
political activity [42]. The extent of interdependence may lead firms to anticipate the 
need to control risk in an alliance.  
 
Control mechanisms 
Control mechanisms affect the degree of control in the alliance. Ownership structure, 
hierarchical structure and contracts are formal (hierarchical) control mechanisms, 
whereas trust is an informal control mechanism and sometimes seen as a substitute for 
control [43]. Alliance governance structures that are characterized by more formal 
control mechanisms better process information and coordinate the alliance [44]. While 
formal procedures and routines may hinder creativity in decision-making processes 
[45], a high degree of formalization may simplify decision-making due to role 
ambiguity reduction, conflict resolution and facilitating goal congruence [46]. In 
addition, a high degree of centrality, which is another control mechanism, may lead to 
dominance of individuals, non-integrated decisions and delays due to lower efficiency 
in the decision-making process, when decision making is concentrated at higher levels. 
Although a low degree of centralization may also lead to delays and non-optimal 
decisions, it stimulates agreement on decisions [47]. Trust on the other hand may 
reduce the potential for politics and facilitate managing the alliance [48]. Therefore the 
degree of formal control mechanisms may affect the decision-making procedural 
rationality, while similarly the degree of informal control mechanisms may reduce 
political activity.  
3 Research Method 
This conceptual framework is studied in greater depth and elaborated upon using 
empirical research. The aim of the empirical research was to further develop 
theoretical propositions based on context-specific explanations. Because of the 
exploratory, contextual, complex and uncontrolled nature of the phenomenon a 
multiple cross-sectional retrospective case study method was used [49]. A case study is 
defined as an empirical inquiry within the – not clearly circumscribed – context of 
reality, investigating a contemporary phenomenon [50]. In the case studies, the unit of 
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analysis is the decision-making process at the level of product innovation projects 
within dyadic strategic alliances. 
Alliance case selection 
Three case studies based in the Netherlands were conducted. The cases consisted of 
dyadic alliances, two of which are contractual alliances and one of them is an 
institutional alliance (a joint venture). The contractual and institutional alliances forms 
were chosen, because these forms represent extremes in terms of major governance 
structure characteristics, such as control and interdependence. These alliances were all 
aimed at obtaining complementary resources to develop a new product. The alliance 
cases were selected in different lines of business to allow for control variety in product 
innovation processes and products. The two contractual alliances are concerned with 
Airplane Parts and Insulation Products, whereas the joint venture involved Biogas 
Plant Equipment (see table 1). The names are fictitious for reasons of confidentiality. 
Whereas in the Biogas and the Airplane case the products and technologies were new 
to both the firm and the market, the product in the Insulation products case was only an 
adjustment of previous products. All cases are vertical alliance types, though the 
Biogas case is not a customer-supplier relationship. These three main case studies were 
preceded by a mini pilot case of a joint venture based on one interview. This mini pilot 
case was aimed at verifying interview questions, structures and skills. 
 
Table 1 Alliance, product innovation and respondent characteristics 
Alliance name Alliance 
form 
Product 
innovation 
Alliance partner Respondent job description 
Biogas Plant Equipment 
 
Joint 
Venture 
Radical Vertical higher-level partner 1  Sales manager & shareholder 
Vertical lower-level partner 2 Project participant & share 
holder 
Airplane Parts Contractual  Radical Customer partner 1 Director R&D 
Supplier partner 2 Director R&D 
Insulation Products Contractual  Incremental Supplier partner 1 Business Development 
manager 
Supplier partner 1 New Business manager 
 
Data collection and analysis 
Within each alliance, two project-informed respondents have been interviewed in-
depth. In two alliances, Airplane Parts and Biogas Plant Equipment, the respondents 
came from both partners to enhance the data reliability on the one hand and data 
completeness on the other. In the Insulation product alliance two respondents came 
from the same partner, because the other partner did not permit informants to 
participate in the research. The respondents have all been involved as key informants 
in main decisions within product innovation projects in the alliances. Table 1 gives an 
overview of the respondent characteristics. The in-depth interview can be characterized 
as a standardized semi-structured interview, allowing the respondents to elaborate 
upon answers, which adds to the depth of the explanations.  
 Our constructs were operationalized in the following way. Interdependence has 
been measured in terms of resource dependence, task and process integration and task 
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specialization [51]. For control mechanisms we used indicators such as the degree of 
hierarchy [52], contract completeness and trust [53]. Procedural rationality has been 
operationalized in terms of rational analysis through the search and sharing of 
complete and relevant information [54]. Political activity has been measured as 
accepted difference of opinion, bargaining and compromises [55], opportunistic 
behavior [56] and use of power and conflicting goals/interests [57]. Consensus is 
measured as agreement over a decision and best possible decision 58], whereas 
commitment is operationalized in terms of ‘my decision’, defending the decision, 
changeability of the decision and resources allocated according to the decision [59]. 
 The interviews have been recorded, transcribed and reported in case descriptions. 
The interview data were processed using a combination of literal and interpretive 
procedures [60]. We analyzed the data using a pattern-matching logic according to 
procedures as described by Yin [61]. Empirically-based patterns within cases were 
compared back and forth with patterns described in theory and - within the boundaries 
of our initial conceptual framework - developed into propositions. The procedures for 
cross-case analysis were based on the theoretical replication logic comparing the 
patterns within the cases across the polar alliance contexts.  
4 Results 
The results can be subdivided into two parts. The first part consists of the empirical 
data that characterize the governance structure in terms of alliance forms. The second 
part contains the empirical data with respect to the relationships (as shown in figure 1) 
between, firstly, governance structure characteristics and the decision-making process 
characteristics of product innovation projects and, secondly, decision-making process 
characteristics of the product innovation projects and its decision-making effectiveness 
characteristics.   
 
Figure 1 Conceptual framework 
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Alliance governance structure forms and characteristics 
In order to obtain a broad indication of the genetics of the case alliances, both alliance 
forms, contractual alliance (CA) and the joint venture (JV) have been classified in 
terms of the governance structure characteristics on the basis of 6 respondents 
perception scores (see table 2).  
 
Table 2 Alliance governance structure forms and characteristics of the three cases 
Alliance governance structure                 Contractual (4 respondents) Joint Venture (2 respondents) 
Degree of: Low Medium High Low Medium High 
- hierarchy 4 - - - - 2 
- strived for completeness of contracts 2 1 1 - - 2 
- trust relationship - - 4 - - 2 
- resource dependency of partners 1 2 1 - 2 - 
- tasks specialization of partners - 2 2 - - 2 
- tasks / process integration 4 - - - 2 - 
 
Table 2 shows that the contractual alliances are less strong in terms of control and 
interdependence compared to the joint venture. The degree of hierarchy and the degree 
to which is completeness of contracts is strived for is more frequently perceived as 
higher, while the task specialization and task/process integration are more frequently 
perceived as lower. With respect to the perceived degree of trust relationship and 
resource dependency the contractual alliances cannot be distinguished from the joint 
venture. 
Governance structure and decision-making process 
Interdependence 
The interdependence consists of the resource dependency, the task/process integration 
and the task specialization. The results show that although the resource dependency 
has a large effect on the decision-making process, there is no difference found between 
the contractual alliance and the joint venture. When the degree of dependency 
increases the dependent partner will put everything into a positive decision-making 
process. With respect to procedural rationality the respondent answers converge on the 
point that dependency makes the partner put more effort in collecting complete 
information. As the R&D-director of the Airplane CA supplier notes: “the more you 
are dependent on each other, the more you will search for complete information, 
because this is very much in your own interest”.  
 This dependency also decreases the political activity, because the partners are more 
inclined to accept a difference of opinion and are less inclined to use power and behave 
opportunistically. For example, the R&D-director of the Airplane CA supplier states 
that: “if you become more dependent on each other, the mutual relationship becomes 
more important, and as a consequence you will more easily respect each others opinion 
and also earlier water the wine, bargain and compromise to reach an agreement.” Also 
the Sales manager of the Biogas JV partner 1 agrees with this point when he states that 
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“you cannot afford to use improper power if you are dependent of the partner firm, but 
you can if you are the stronger party”. Therefore we suggest that: 
 
P1: Increases in the resource dependency will increase the use of procedural rationality 
and decrease the use of political activity in both contractual alliances and joint 
ventures. 
 
The interview results suggest that the degree of task and process integration differ 
between a joint venture and a contractual alliance. In addition, respondents support 
each other in the position that more task and process integration will increase the 
procedural rationality. For example, the R&D-director of the Airplane CA customer 
stated that: “If we were working as partners next to each other, then you would 
probably have shared more information, because the dissemination will be easier”. The 
supplier R&D-director (Airplane CA) and Business Development manager of the 
Insulation CA argue that the tasks are hardly integrated, but when the tasks and 
processes are more intertwined, there will be less search for complete information 
from the partner, because frequently there will be access to the same knowledge and 
information. The project member of the Biogas JV partner 2 supports this point saying 
that: “you have become a link within the chain and therefore you share more 
information with the partner”. He adds that “because we perform tasks together, you 
discuss more during daily work and therefore probably fewer negotiations are used and 
also fewer compromises have to be reached, because you are both completely 
informed”.  
 This also illustrates that the use of political activity tends to decrease with high task 
integration. Similarly, in the Biogas JV case, the Sales manager (partner 1) argues that 
there is less need to check partner information, because you both possess the same 
information. But the project participant (Biogas JV partner 2) warns that it is therefore 
more important to check partner information on completeness and relevance. Though, 
he adds that: “the positive use of power decreases when tasks performed are integrated, 
because the difference in knowledge also decreases”. Interestingly, New Business 
manager of the Insulation CA partner, said that: “when the process and task integration 
increases, the possibilities to behave opportunistically grow larger”. Thus: 
 
P2: A higher degree of task and process integration results in a higher degree of 
procedural rationality and tends to lower the use of political activity in a joint venture, 
but may increase the use of political activity in a contractual alliance. 
 
With respect to the degree of task specialization the interview results reveal that 
political activity increases with the degree of task specialization, while the effect on 
procedural rationality as well as the difference between the contractual alliances and 
the joint venture is not clear. In addition, not surprisingly, the degree of task 
specialization is strongly related to the degree of task and process integration. The 
reason is that task specialization makes it more difficult to integrate processes. The 
explanations of the contractual alliance respondents with respect to the effect of the 
degree of specialization on procedural rationality do not converge to the point made by 
the New Business manager of the Insulation CA partner on information completeness 
and relevance: “If the tasks of the partners are specialized, you have less knowledge 
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about each others task area and you will search less for completeness of information. 
Therefore, we also control the information around our field of expertise. In addition to 
the completeness of information, the focus on the relevancy of information is less 
strong, because as non-experts we cannot judge this information.” In contrast, in the 
Airplane CA, the supplier R&D-director states that “because we all have our own field 
of expertise, we exactly want to know from the partner under which conditions the 
problem emerges”. The first explanation seems to assume an atmosphere of trust, 
while the other explanation takes a more rational viewpoint. This is likely to be related 
to the difference between the types of innovation. The Airplane CA develops a radical 
innovation, which gives far more uncertainty than an incremental innovation as 
developed in the Insulated CA. The same contrast holds for information distribution. 
Both respondents in Biogas JV give the same explanation as the New Business 
manager of the Insulation CA partner with respect to procedural rationality. This issue 
deserves further research. 
 All respondents are similar in their statements on the effect on political activity. 
Differences of opinion are more easily accepted and resolved in favor of the partner 
with the relevant field of expertise. A partner may use this power position not only to 
serve their own interests, but also to serve the common interests. Thus we suggest that: 
 
P3: A higher degree of task specialization will decrease the potential for political 
activity in both contractual alliances and joint ventures. 
 
Control 
Control consists of the hierarchical mechanisms, contracts and trust.  
With respect to hierarchical mechanisms the interview results show inconsistent data 
of an effect of hierarchy on procedural rationality and therefore do not justify a 
proposition. Conversely, ample explanations show a negative relationship between the 
degree of hierarchy and political activity. Hierarchical mechanisms such as centrality 
and formal procedures may diminish the potential of difference of opinions and 
conflicts. For example, the customer R&D-director (Airplane CA) said that: “In our 
contractual alliance the degree of hierarchy is low, but a higher degree of hierarchy has 
a negative effect on the acceptance level of a difference of opinion, because a higher 
degree of hierarchy means that the decision-making process can be influenced and 
differences of opinion can be eliminated”. This suggests that in a contractual alliance 
the potential for differences of opinion and conflicts - and consequently the bargaining 
potential - is larger due to lower degrees of hierarchy. In a joint venture, the effect of 
hierarchy seems to be overruled by the effect of ownership structure. According to the 
Sales manager in the Biogas JV: “In this cooperation we are dealing with one joint 
corporation with mainly a common objective, and as a result bargaining and discussing 
among managing directors is less needed”. Consequently, we propose that: 
 
P4: A higher degree of hierarchy reduces political activity in contractual alliances, 
while in joint ventures the effect of hierarchy is overruled by the effect of ownership 
structure. 
 
Both in contractual alliances as well as the joint venture, contracts are used and 
utilizable to establish agreement with respect to product innovation tasks and processes 
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and consequently to avoid undesirable behavior. In the contractual alliances, formal 
contracts may diminish information processing, and therefore negatively affects 
procedural rationality, under the assumption that the situation does not change. The 
supplier R&D-director in the Airplane CA makes this point clearly: “through 
formalization of contracts the need to have complete information from the partner firm 
is lower, because one can be judged on the execution tasks. However, establishing 
issues in contracts can also result in more bargaining, because situations change and 
are never identical. This is also the reason that we establish few things.”  
 However, the Sales manager of the Biogas JV partner 1 stated that the way in which 
information has to be searched for and distributed is established in a contract. This 
means that contracts actually enhance procedural rationality.  
 The interview results also reveal that using formal contracts reduce the potential to 
use power and as a result decrease the political activity. For example, the Business 
Development manager in the Insulated CA explained that: “the more issues are 
established in a contract, the fewer possibilities are left to use power”. Also in the 
Biogas joint venture, the project member (partner 2) who gave a similar explanation as 
the Sales manager (partner 1) noted that: “bargaining and compromises will also be 
necessary, but because issues are well established in contracts, they will become less 
important”. The Sales manager added that establishing the positions of the partners in 
contracts particularly determine the use of power. Consequently, we propose the 
following two propositions. 
 
P5: Formal contracts in contractual alliances reduce information-processing and 
therefore decrease procedural rationality in stable situations - while increasing 
procedural rationality in unstable situations - , and decrease political activity. 
 
P6: Formal contracts specifying information-processing procedures in joint ventures 
increase the procedural rationality, whereas the completeness of formal contracts (e.g. 
also including the positions of the partners) decreases political activity. 
 
Trust appears to have an ambivalent effect on procedural rationality as well as on 
political activity in both contractual alliances as well as the joint venture. While trust 
reduces the need to search for complete and relevant partner information, it stimulates 
sharing (not confidential) information between partners. From the perspective of the 
contractual alliance, New Business manager in the Insulated CA clearly states that: “if 
the partner is trusted, one assumes that the delivered information is complete and 
relevant. The degree of trust has a positive effect on sharing information, that is 
supposed to be relevant for the other party and is not consisting of confidential 
information”. In addition, according to the other respondent in the Insulated CA (the 
Business Development manager) said the following. “When you have trust in a partner 
you will more easily share information. When you have trust in a partner firm, you do 
not see a difference of opinion as a threat, but as an opportunity to arrive at a better 
decision through new information.” The R&D-director of the Airplane CA customer 
agrees: “The degree of trust determines how you deal with power. A lot of trust makes 
the use of power less/not necessary”. Also in the Biogas JV the Sales manager (partner 
1) states similar things and adds that more trust lead to more watering the wine during 
negotiations. However, the project member of Biogas JV partner 2 remarks that: “If 
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you trust each other well, then you’ll allow more positive power [e.g. devil’s advocate] 
to be used.” This gives rise to formulate two propositions. 
 
P7:  While trust has a negative effect on the search for complete and relevant partner 
information, it positively effects the sharing of (not confidential) information between 
partners. 
 
P8:  While trust has a negative effect on political activity, it may positively affect the 
use of the devil’s advocacy control procedures. 
 
Decision-making process characteristics and decision-making effectiveness 
Two decision-making characteristics, procedural rationality and political activity have 
been investigated empirically in association with decision-making effectiveness in 
terms of the degree of consensus and commitment.  
 With respect to procedural rationality the interview results display a positive 
effect on consensus as well as commitment. The effect of the degree of sharing 
information seemed not strong, but appeared to be positive for both consensus and 
commitment. The degree of searching information is strongly associated with relevant 
and completeness of information, but also appeared to have a negative effect on 
commitment in terms of decision changeability. The respondents were also consistent 
with regard to the influence of the degree of complete and relevant information on 
consensus (degree of agreement and best possible decision) and commitment 
(defending the decision, non-changeability of the decision and allocation of resources). 
Thus, we give the following proposition. 
 
P9: Procedural rationality positively affects decision effectiveness. 
 
Concerning political activity the respondents were consistent with respect to the effect 
on consensus and commitment. The degree of bargaining and finding compromises is 
very important and found to be positive in relation to consensus and commitment. 
However, processes of bargaining and compromising may also lead to astray from 
starting-points that strongly differ between partners and negatively affect commitment. 
Opportunistic behavior is associated with socially undesirable behavior and appeared 
to negatively relate to consensus and commitment. The degree to which differences of 
opinions are accepted relates also positive to consensus and commitment. The use of 
power with respect to self-interests has a negative affect consensus (indicated by the 
degree to which a decision is the best possible) and commitment (in terms of ‘my 
decision’ and defending the decision). However, the use of expertise power is also 
found to be related to consensus and commitment. Therefore, we hypothesize the 
following. 
 
P10: Political activity negatively affects decision effectiveness, except for astray-
leading bargaining and finding compromises due large differences of starting-points 
and except for the use of expertise power. 
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Conclusions 
Concluding, the case study results on the one side give empirical evidence that product 
innovation project decision-making effectiveness is dependent upon strategic decision-
making process characteristics in terms of the presence of procedural rationality and 
the absence of political activity. On the other side, our empirical research indicates that 
procedural rationality and political activity are affected by the interdependence and 
control mechanisms of the governance structure. Furthermore, control mechanisms 
(except for trust) and interdependence (except for resource dependency) were found to 
distinguish contractual alliances from joint ventures. Moreover, we found some 
evidence though further research is needed that product innovativeness, radical versus 
incremental may affect the degree to which task specialization as an interdependence 
measure is related to procedural rationality of the decision making process.  
Discussion 
These conclusions contribute to the recent debate in the product innovation literature 
whether and how product innovation within alliances differs from product innovation 
within a firm [62]. Specifically, it suggests that while strategic decision making is 
important for new product innovation success, strategic decision making within 
product innovation projects executed in dyadic strategic alliance is determined by the 
alliance governance structure. This is in line with other studies on the topic such as 
Bierly and Coombs who found that the stage of product development is related to 
alliance governance structure and instability [63]. These conclusions also contribute to 
alliance research studying alliance idiosyncrasies at the level of product innovation 
projects rather than at the firm or product development level. The conclusions also 
have managerial implications and are subject to limitations and future research efforts, 
which are described in the following sections. 
Managerial implications 
Although limited in scale, the results of this study imply that managers may want to 
take the governance structure in relation to decision-making characteristics into 
account - in addition to industry-related, firm-specific as well as technological and 
partner-related factors - when choosing an alliance governance structure in pursuing 
new product innovation objectives. This gains importance if research evidence is 
mounting that product innovation success is a solid base of competitive advantage and 
future growth. These choices are likely to be related to the recurring strategic decision 
whether to develop the new product within the firm, within strategic alliance 
cooperation or within a newly acquired or recently merged firm. In addition, regarding 
strategic alliance cooperation, it does raise questions such as what priorities and 
objectives do managers need to set when determining with whom to cooperate, which 
product innovations to invest in and what product innovation projects to foster.  
 The results of this research also have implications for managers currently involved 
in decision making in product innovation projects within strategic alliances. It may 
help managers finding explanations for the decision-making problems and causes at 
hand in product innovation projects. In particular, it might facilitate managers 
searching for and using decision-making styles and methods that smooth the progress 
of decision making aligned to the alliance governance structure. 
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Limitations and suggestions for future research 
The two main limitations of our study are presented here. Firstly, the empirical 
research is limited to the number of factors that could maximally be handled 
examining relationships between concepts in in-depth interviews. With respect to the 
main governance structure characteristics only interdependence (resource dependency, 
tasks and process integration and task specialization) and control (hierarchical 
mechanisms, contracts and trust) have been included. Additional research is needed to 
investigate the association between hierarchical mechanisms and procedure rationality, 
due data inconsistency. Moreover, academic research on alliances suggests that in 
addition to interdependence and control, the flexibility may be associated with 
decision-making and commitment [64]. Furthermore, decision-making process factors 
are confined to the most important factors such as procedural rationality and political 
activity with corresponding indicators [65]. But other factors may also play a role with 
regard to governance structures and decision-making effectiveness such as leadership 
style [66], and decision-making method [67]. Further analysis is required to distinguish 
these factors clearly from governance structure control as well as decision-making 
effectiveness and subsequently include them into future empirical research.  
 Second, our in-depth analysis of the three dyadic alliances included in our empirical 
research strongly limits the generalizability of the conclusions to the population of 
alliances. Finding dyadic alliances that are willing to participate in case study research 
and to provide access to respondents from both partners proofed to be difficult. 
Nevertheless, first, a thorough understanding of the antecedents and consequences of 
decision-making requires future researchers to incorporate more dyadic alliances in 
various industries and with different characteristics in the domain of decision-making 
and product development
 
[68]. For example, not only dyadic alliances may be 
investigated as alliance constellations consisting of at least three alliance partners are 
expected to change the influence on decision-making in product development projects 
[69]. Furthermore, as cooperation within product development and product innovation 
success become increasingly important for modern-day firms, future research must be 
aimed at investigating the effect of governance structure characteristics on decision-
making and its effectiveness at a far larger scale. Controlling for industry, firm, 
alliance and product innovation effects, survey methods may be used in combination 
with sophisticated analysis techniques to determine the relative size effects and arrive 
at more generalizable conclusions. 
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